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Abstract. We provide a formal model for identification schemes. Un-
der this model, we give strong definitions for security and privacy. Our
model captures the notion of a powerful adversary who can monitor all
communications, trace tags within a limited period of time, corrupt tags,
and get side channel information on the reader output. Adversaries who
do not have access to this side channel are called narrow adversaries.
Depending on restrictions on corruption, adversaries are called strong,
destructive, forward, or weak adversaries. We derive some separation
results: strong privacy is impossible. Narrow-strong privacy implies key
agreement. We also prove some constructions: narrow-strong and forward
privacy based on a public-key cryptosystem, narrow-destructive privacy
based on a random oracle, and weak privacy based on a pseudorandom
function.
1 The Privacy Issue in RFID Schemes
RFID protocols are used to identify cheap tags through wireless channels. How-
ever, putting tags in wearable items leads to privacy concerns. Although several
privacy models exist so far, all have their own limitations, and finally, the classes
of protocols that achieve privacy for one model or the other are not always com-
parable. A widely accepted flexible model permitting to establish a common
measure of the performance of identification protocol is still under construction.
We aim at contributing to this effort. To do so, we propose formal definitions
of RFID schemes and adversaries and consider a twofold characterization of a
scheme in terms of security and privacy. The former assesses the soundness of
tag authentication. The latter property is for the ability to resist to adversaries
aiming at identifying, tracing, or linking tags.
In a nutshell, we formalize several types of privacy and study inherent limi-
tations for RFID applications. We discuss which restrictions we can assume re-
garding tag corruption and availability of side channels. We show how to achieve
those levels of privacy and what must be used in terms of conventional vs. public-
key cryptography or stateless vs. rewritable tags. We show that the strongest
possible level of privacy implies key agreement, thus mandating the use of some
public-key cryptography techniques. We present a simple protocol for that.
We assume a powerful adversary who can control all communications and
interfere with the system. Cheap tags are not tamper-resistant so we analyze
the ability to assure privacy and security even when an adversary is allowed to
corrupt tags and retrieve the internal state. One novelty of our models is that
they provide some kind of “exposure slots”. Namely, adversaries can trace a tag
within a limited time period during which this tag remains at the vicinity of the
adversary. During this period, they can refer to the tag by using a temporary
identity. In practice, this temporary identity can be the 32-bit number that is
used in ISO/IEC 14443-3 norm [22] in singulation protocols for collision avoid-
ance [4]. It can also be some tag named from its radiation pattern signature [21].
Exposure time periods are indeed unavoidable.
We consider several types of restrictions regarding tag corruption. The weak-
est model does not allow corruption. The relevant model for the so-called forward
privacy allows corruption, but only at the end of the attack so that no further ac-
tive action happens after corruption.1 One less restrictive (thus stronger) model
tolerates corruption at any time, but assumes that opening a tag destroys it
so that it no longer circulates in nature. This model is called destructive. Our
strongest model allows corruption at any time and even to put the tag back to
nature so that tracing it is still considered as a threat. Although the purpose for
distinguishing those two latter models is not clear, we prove that they separate.
Another question, as studied in Juels-Weis [24], is whether the adversary
has access to the protocol partial output or not. Namely, can we consider that
the adversary knows whether a reader succeeded to identify a legitimate tag or
not? We call narrow adversaries those who do not have access to this information
while “wider” adversaries can get it from side channels (e.g. the question whether
a door opens or not). It is well known that security or privacy can collapse in
such a case (e.g. for the HB+ protocol [17,23,25] or the OSK protocol [24,30]).
It happens to be quite orthogonal to the corruption variants so that we obtain
an array of 4 × 2 = 8 adversarial models. We prove that those privacy models
are pairwise different.
Related work. Many simple challenge-response protocols have been proposed
without addressing corruption [14,28,39]. The Ohkubo-Suzuki-Kinoshita pro-
tocol (OSK) [30,31] (see also [3,12,32]) made forward privacy possible. A few
attempts have been made to really formalize privacy in RFID protocols. One
of the first attempts was made by Avoine-Dysli-Oechslin [3], later extended in
the Thesis of Avoine [2]. Following their model, privacy is formalized by the
ability to distinguish two known tags. The model excludes the availability of
side-channel information such as whether a protocol instance on the reader did
succeed. Juels and Weis [24] extended this model using side-channel information
and making the two target tags chosen by the adversary. Another model was
proposed by Burmester, van Le, and de Medeiros [8,26]. In all these models,
corrupted tags cannot be the target of privacy adversaries. Another approach by
Damg˚ard-Østergaard [10] studies RFID schemes “with symmetric cryptography
only” to focus on the tradeoffs between complexity and security.
1 Note that some authors call this notion backward privacy [27]. Their notion of forward
privacy is included in our notion of strong privacy.
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Our contribution. In this paper we present a complete formalism for defining
RFID schemes, their security, and build a hierarchy of privacy models. Our
definition for security is equivalent to Damg˚ard-Østergaard [10]. We prove that
security against strong adversaries can be easily achieved using a pseudorandom
function family. We prove that strong privacy is impossible. We show that an
RFID scheme that achieves narrow-strong privacy can efficiently be transformed
into a key agreement protocol, meaning that this type of privacy essentially
needs public-key cryptography techniques. On the other hand, we show that a
public-key cryptosystem that resists to adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks can
be used to define a simple narrow-strong private and forward private protocol.
We further prove the narrow-destructive privacy of an OSK-like protocol [31] in
the random oracle model and the weak privacy of a classical challenge-response
protocol based on a pseudorandom function. This work follows up some joint
work during the Thesis of Bocchetti [7].
2 Definitions
In the sequel, a function in terms of a security parameter s is said polynomial
if there exists a constant n such that it is O(sn). Similarly, a function is said
negligible if there exists a constant x > 0 such that it is O(x−s). For the sake of
readability we concentrate on asymptotic complexities and security although all
our results can be written with more precise bounds.
The tag is a passive transponder identified by a unique ID. We typically
focus on a cheap tag which is passive: it has no batteries, it can operate just
when interrogated by a reader and only for a short time. It has limited memory :
each tag has only a few Kbit of memory on board. It has limited computational
abilities. Each tag can perform only basic cryptographic calculations: hash cal-
culations [15], pseudorandom generation [35], symmetric encryption [14]. Some
elliptic-curve arithmetic [5] and zero-knowledge identification [9,18,19] may fit,
as well as public-key cryptography [1,16,38], but remain expensive so far. It is not
tamper proof. It communicates at up to a limited distance: the communication
Tag→Reader is limited to a few meters (if not centimeters).
The reader is a device composed by one or more transceivers and a backend
processing subsystem. Security issues within the reader are not addressed in this
work, moreover we focus on single backend readers. Note however that sometimes
in literature “reader” denotes the transceiver alone. The purpose of the reader
is to interact with tags so that it can tell legitimate tags (i.e. tags which are
registered in the database) and unknown tags apart, and further identify (i.e.
infer their ID) legitimate tags.
Definition 1 (RFID Scheme). An RFID scheme is composed by
– a setup scheme SetupReader(1s) which generates a private/public key pair
(KS ,KP ) for the reader depending on a security parameter s. The key KS is
to be stored in the reader backend. The key KP is publicly released. Through-
out this paper we assume that s is implicitly specified in KP so that there is
no need to mention s any longer.
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– a polynomial-time algorithm SetupTagKP (ID) which returns (K,S): the tag
specific secret K and the initial state S of the tag. The pair (ID,K) is to be
stored in the reader backend when the tag is legitimate.
– a polynomial-time interactive protocol between a reader and a tag in which
the reader ends with a tape Output.
An RFID scheme is such that the output is correct except with a negligible
probability for any polynomial-time experiment which can be described as fol-
lows.
1: set up the reader
2: create many tags including a subject one named ID
3: execute a complete protocol between reader and tag ID
The output is correct if and only if Output =⊥ and tag ID is not legitimate, or
Output = ID and ID is legitimate.
When Output =⊥ but tag ID is legitimate, we have a false negative. When
Output 6=⊥ but tag ID is not legitimate, we have a false positive. When Output 6∈
{ID,⊥} and tag ID is legitimate, we have an incorrect identification.
The RFID scheme is stateless if the tag state S is not allowed to change in
time. Note that we do not a priori assume that tags know their ID nor their
secret K: this is up to the protocol specification to make them extractable from
S. We assume that a reader can run several concurrent instances of a protocol
but that tags cannot. In this paper, we do not consider reader authentication so
we do not consider any output on the side of the tag.2
In practice, some information about Outputmay leak from a side channel (e.g.
by observing a door opening at a tag transit and deducing that authentication
was successful). Having access to such an information could allow an adversary to
gather information about tag identities. For simplicity, we focus here on passive
tags which are exempt of side channel except by full corruption.
2.1 Adversaries
The characterization of the adversary is essentially done by specifying the actions
that she is allowed to perform (i.e. the oracles she can query), the goal of her
attack (i.e. the game she plays) and the way in which she can interact with
the system (i.e. the rules of the game). We consider that, at every time, a tag
can either be a free tag or a drawn tag. Drawn tags are the ones within “visual
contact” to the adversary so that she can communicate while being able to link
communications. Free tags are all the other tags. Two oracles are defined below
to draw or free tags. We call virtual tag a unique reference (e.g. using a drawing
sequence number or a nonce) to the action of drawing a tag. This plays the same
role as a temporary identity. Note that two different virtual tags may refer to
the same tag that has been drawn, freed, and drawn again.
2 This model was extended for mutual authentication in the Thesis of Paise [33].
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Definition 2 (Adversary). An adversary is an algorithm which takes a public
key KP as input and runs by using the eight following oracles.
– CreateTagb(ID): creates a free tag, either legitimate (b = 1) or not (b = 0),
with unique identifier ID. This oracle uses SetupTagKP algorithm to set up
the tag and (for b = 1 only) to update the system database. By convention,
b is implicitly 1 when omitted.
– DrawTag(distr)→ (vtag1, b1, . . . , vtagn, bn): moves from the set of free tags
to the set of drawn tags a tuple of tags at random following the probability
distribution distr (which is specified by a polynomially bounded sampling al-
gorithm). The oracle returns a vector of fresh identifiers (vtag1, . . . , vtagn)
which allows to anonymously designate these tags. Drawing tags already
drawn or not existing provoke the oracle to return ⊥ in place of the respec-
tive virtual tag. We further assume that this oracle returns bits (b1, . . . , bn)
telling whether the drawn tags are legitimate or not.3 This oracle keeps a
hidden table T such that T (vtag) is the ID of vtag.
– Free(vtag): moves the virtual tag vtag back to the set of the free tags. This
makes vtag unreachable. (That is, using vtag in oracle calls is no longer
allowed.)
– Launch→ pi: makes the reader launch a new protocol instance pi.
– SendReader(m,pi) → m′ (resp. SendTag(m, vtag) → m′): sends a mes-
sage m to a protocol instance pi for the reader (resp. to virtual tag vtag)
and receives the answer m′ (that is meant to be sent to the counterpart). By
convention we write Execute(vtag)→ (pi, transcript) to group one Launch
query and successive use of SendReader and SendTag to execute a com-
plete protocol between the reader and the tag vtag. It returns the transcript
of the protocol, i.e. the list of successive protocol messages.
– Result(pi) → x: when pi is complete, returns 1 if Output 6=⊥ and 0 other-
wise.
– Corrupt(vtag) → S: returns the current state S of the tag. If vtag is no
longer used after this oracle call, we say that vtag is destroyed.
The adversary plays a game which starts by setting up the RFID system and
feeding the adversary with the public key. The adversary uses the oracle following
some rules of the game and produces an output. Depending on the rules, the
adversary wins or looses.
Definition 3 (Strong, destructive, forward, weak, and narrow adver-
sary). We consider polynomial-time adversaries. Let STRONG be the class of
adversaries who have access to the above oracles. Let DESTRUCTIVE be the class
of adversaries who never use vtag again after a Corrupt(vtag) query (i.e. who
destroy it). Let FORWARD be the class of adversaries in which Corrupt queries
can only be followed by other Corrupt queries. Let WEAK be the class of ad-
versaries who do no Corrupt query. Let NARROW be the class of adversaries
who do no Result query.
3 Namely, we assume that adversaries always have means to deduce whether a tag is
legitimate or not by side channels.
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Clearly, we have WEAK ⊆ FORWARD ⊆ DESTRUCTIVE ⊆ STRONG.
2.2 Security of RFID Schemes
Definition 4 (Security). We consider any adversary in the class STRONG.
We say the adversary wins if at least one protocol instance pi on the reader iden-
tified an uncorrupted legitimate tag ID but pi and ID did not have any matching
conversation, i.e. they exchanged well interleaved and faithfully (but maybe with
some time delay) transmitted messages until pi completed. We call ID a target tag
and pi a target instance. We say that the RFID scheme is secure if the success
probability of any such adversary is negligible.
All protocols that we study here are two-pass protocols in which the reader
starts by sending a random challenge a and the tag produces a response c de-
pending on a. This way, attacks leading to matching protocol transcripts but
badly interleaved messages have negligible probability of success.
We use the following lemma to prove security of RFID schemes in our paper.
Lemma 5 (Simple security for special RFID scheme). We consider an
RFID scheme for which the reader protocol satisfies the following structure. First,
the communication messages from the reader do not depend on the database.
Second, there is a predicate R and a sampling algorithm S such that the output
is computed by running S on the set E of all ID corresponding to a database entry
(ID,K) verifying R(ID,K; τ), where τ is the protocol transcript. We assume that
R and S do not use the database (but may use the secret key KS). Third, the
selected database entry may be updated by an extra algorithm not depending on
other database entries or KS. The algorithm S is such that
– if E = ∅ then S(E) =⊥
– if E 6= ∅ then S(E) outputs an element of E.
Finally, we assume that there exists an easily computable predicate R′ such that
if a tag ID and the reader have a matching conversation with transcript τ and if
(ID,K) is a database entry then R(ID,K; τ) ⇐⇒ R′(n) where n is the number
of previously completed protocol executions on the tag ID side since the last suc-
ceeded one. (A protocol execution with ID is called succeeded if it has a matching
conversation with the reader with output ID.) We consider adversaries who
– create (and draw) a single tag ID
– use Launch, SendReader, SendTag
– use an oracle who checks the predicate R on inputs different from ID
– use an oracle simulating S
– end on a final SendReader to an instance pi.
The adversary wins if the protocol instance pi on the reader identified tag ID but
has no matching conversation. We say that the scheme is simply secure if the
success probability of any such adversary is negligible. If the scheme is simply
secure, then it is secure.
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Proof (Sketch). Let A be a strong adversary playing the security game. We can
simulate DrawTag and Free queries and reduce to adversaries who draw tags
once for all upon creation. Next, we can reduce to an adversary who guesses
the first target tag ID upon creation, as well as the first target instance pi.
(The success probability is divided by a polynomially bounded factor.) Then,
we can simulate all tags except ID so that only tag ID is really created. We show
by induction that Output can be generated with same distribution (except on
pi) when the adversary knows all database entries except (ID,K). To compute
R(ID,K; τ) without knowing K, if τ is non-matching then R is not satisfied,
otherwise R′ can be used. We can thus simulate the reader and Result queries.
One trick is not to send the last message to a reader instance if the simulated
output is not ID and to send it otherwise so that the database entry can be
updated. By using the simple security we deduce that A has negligible success
probability. The scheme is thus secure. uunionsq
2.3 Privacy of RFID Schemes
RFID schemes are given three cryptographic properties: correctness, security,
and privacy. Depending on the application, not all properties may be required.
Correctness is part of the definition of RFID schemes and is implicitly assumed.
Security (i.e. soundness of tag identification) is defined in Section 2.2. We define
privacy in terms of ability to infer non-trivial ID relations from protocol mes-
sages. This generalizes the notion of anonymity (for which the ID of tags cannot
be inferred) and untraceability (for which the equality of two tags cannot be
inferred).
Definition 6 (Privacy). We consider adversaries who start with an attack
phase allowing oracle queries then pursuing an analysis phase with no ora-
cle query. In between phases, the adversary receives the hidden table T of the
DrawTag oracle then outputs either true or false. The adversary wins if the
output is true. We say that the RFID scheme is P -private if all such adversaries
which belong to class P are trivial following Def. 7.
Definition 7 (Blinder, trivial adversary). A Blinder B for an adversary A
is a polynomial-time algorithm which sees the same messages as A and simulates
the Launch, SendReader, SendTag, and Result oracles to A. The blinder
does not have access to the reader tapes so does not know the secret key nor
the database. A blinded adversary AB is itself an adversary who does not use
the Launch, SendReader, SendTag, and Result oracles. An adversary A
is trivial if there exists a B such that |Pr[A wins]− Pr[AB wins]| is negligible.
Informally, an adversary is trivial if it makes no effective use of protocol mes-
sages. Namely, these messages can be simulated without significantly affecting
the success probability of the adversary. We stress that our privacy notion mea-
sures the privacy loss in the wireless link but not through tag corruption (since
Corrupt queries are not blinded). In other words, we assume that corrupting
a tag always compromise privacy and we only focus on wireless leakage.
Clearly, we have the following links between privacy notions.
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strong ⇒ destructive ⇒ forward ⇒ weak
⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
narrow-strong ⇒ narrow-destructive ⇒ narrow-forward ⇒ narrow-weak
We will show separation between all those notions. We summarize below the
non-implications with a reference to the appropriate notes.
strong destructive
Note 10
6⇐ forward
Note 14
6⇐ weak
6⇑ Note 10 6⇑ Note 18 6⇑ Note 18 6⇑ Note 18
narrow-strong
Note 16
6⇐ narrow-destructive
Note 17
6⇐ narrow-forward
Note 14
6⇐ narrow-weak
Some non-implication results may assume the existence of standard primitives
such as IND-CCA public-key cryptosystems, random oracles, or pseudorandom
functions. The non-implication of destructive privacy to strong privacy is equiv-
alent to the feasibility of destructive privacy which is open so far.
In this model, corrupted tags can be the victims of tracing attacks, con-
trarily to the model of Juels-Weis [24] and Burmester-van Le-de Medeiros [8].
For instance, the protocol O-TRAP provides privacy in the sense of [8]. In this
protocol, the reader sends a rtsys challenge to the tag and the tag answers with
some random ri and hKi(r
t
sys, ri) where h is a keyed hash function and Ki is
a key which is permanently stored in the tag state. Clearly, corrupting the tag
reveals Ki that was used in former protocols and enables to identified the tag in
previous sessions. Hence, O-TRAP is not narrow-forward private.
We provide a useful lemma to get rid of Result queries.
Lemma 8. We consider an RFID scheme with the property that whenever a
legitimate tag and the reader have some matching conversation, the reader does
not output ⊥. If the scheme is secure, then narrow-forward (resp. narrow-weak)
privacy implies forward (resp. weak) privacy.
Proof (Sketch). Let A be a forward (resp. weak) adversary for privacy. W.l.o.g.
we can assume that there is no Result query related to an instance that has a
matching conversation with a legitimate tag (in such a case the answers is 1, due
to the hypothesis). Since corruption (if any) are lately done, remaining Result
queries are most likely to yield 0 due to security. Let B be a partial blinder
for A who blinds all Result queries: for all such queries, the simulated answer
0 is returned. We further define an adversary A′ playing the security game by
simulating A and ending before the Corrupt queries. Let E be the event that
one of the Result queries in A would answer 1. When E does not occur, A and
AB produce the same result. Since the scheme is secure, E occurs with negligible
probability. We obtain that A is as effective as the narrow-forward (resp. narrow-
weak) adversary AB . By blinding AB due to the privacy hypothesis, we obtain
that A is as effective as AC for some blinder C. uunionsq
3 Separation Results
3.1 Strong Privacy is Impossible
Theorem 9. A destructive-private RFID scheme is not narrow-strong private.
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Namely, no RFID scheme can achieve privacy with respect to the class
DESTRUCTIVE ∪ (NARROW ∩ STRONG).
Note 10. As a consequence, strong privacy cannot be achieved. As another con-
sequence, narrow-strong privacy (which is achieved by the scheme of Th. 19)
does not imply strong privacy. Similarly, forward privacy (which is achieved by
the same scheme) does not imply destructive privacy.
Proof. Let us consider the following destructive adversary A who simulates to
the reader a tag with state Sb which is either forged (S0) or the one of a corrupted
legitimate tag (S1). The adversary yields true if and only if the reader recognizes
the right case (from Result).
1: (·, S0)← SetupTagKP (ID0)
2: CreateTag(ID1)
3: (vtag1, ·)← DrawTag(ID1)
4: S1 ← Corrupt(vtag1) (destroy it)
5: flip a coin b ∈ {0, 1}
6: pi ← Launch
7: simulate tag of state Sb with pi
8: x← Result(pi)
9: output whether x = b
The complexity of this adversary is polynomial. Clearly, if the protocol execution
is correct, the adversary succeeds. Thus, 1−Pr[A wins] is negligible. Hence, if we
have destructive privacy, there must exist a blinderB such that 1−Pr[AB wins] is
negligible as well. If we now look at a privacy game from the blinder perspective,
it works as follows:
– blinder receives a public key KP
– blinder gets one tag state S1 (by looking at the answer from Corrupt)
– blinder impersonates a reader to a tag whose state is either S1 or some
unknown S0 depending on some unknown bit b
– with high probability, blinder guesses b
Indeed, a blinder is a distinguisher who never uses the secret key of the reader
between a tag with known state and a random one. This means that for a
destructive-private scheme, it must be possible to identify tags whose states
are known a priori. We can use this blinder to construct the following narrow-
strong adversary. Basically, the adversary creates and corrupt two legitimate
tags, feeds the previous distinguisher with one of the tag states, and makes one
of the two tags interact with it. If the distinguisher distinguishes well, the output
is true.
1: create tag ID0 and tag ID1
2: draw both tags
3: corrupt both tags and get their states S0 and S1
4: free both tags
5: draw a random tag: (vtag, ·)← DrawTag(Pr[ID0] = Pr[ID1] = 12 )
6: simulate B with input KP , S1, and interacting with vtag and get bit x
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7: get T and output whether T (vtag) = IDx
This adversary A′ has polynomial complexity and 1− Pr[A′ wins] is negligible.
Clearly, for any blinder B′ we have Pr[A′B′ wins] = 12 . Hence the scheme is not
narrow-strong private. uunionsq
3.2 Narrow-Strong Privacy Requires Key Agreement
A key agreement protocol [11] is an interactive protocol between two participants
Alice and Bob with common public input set to the security parameter s which
ends with a common output bit (the key), except with negligible probability. We
assume that Alice initiates the protocol and that Bob responds. The protocol is
secure (against passive adversary) if the probability that any polynomial-time
algorithm that is fed with the common input and the protocol transcript has a
negligible advantage over 12 to guess the key bit.
We recall that a 2-round key agreement protocol can define a public-key
cryptosystem. Rudich [36] proved a separation between key agreement in k + 1
rounds and key agreement in k rounds, for any k. That is, a separation exists
between key agreement in k rounds (for k 6= 2) and a public-key cryptosystem.
Nevertheless, we do not know any efficient key agreement protocol based on
conventional cryptography only. We use this fact to show that RFID schemes
which achieve narrow-strong privacy need more than conventional cryptography
techniques.
Theorem 11. A narrow-strong private RFID scheme can be transformed (in
polynomial time) into a secure key agreement protocol with same number of
rounds in which Alice simulates SetupTag and the reader and Bob simulates
the tag.
This means that any RFID scheme based on a pseudorandom function or a digital
signature scheme only is unlikely to be narrow-strong private. Indeed, the tag
workload should be at least the same as a responder Bob in a key agreement
protocol of same number of rounds. For two-round protocols, this is equivalent
to a public-key encryption algorithm (the reader does the decryption).
Proof. We construct a protocol that securely sends a key bit b from Bob to Alice.
Intuitively, Alice first creates two legitimate tags and sends their initial states to
Bob. Then, Alice simulates the reader and Bob simulates either tag depending
on the key bit. By identifying the tag, Alice gets b.
1: Alice: (KP ,KS)← SetupReader(1s)
2: Alice: (K0, S0)← SetupTagKP (ID0), (K1, S1)← SetupTagKP (ID1)
3: Alice sends (KP , S0, S1) to Bob and simulates the reader protocol with
database {(ID0,K0), (ID1,K1)}
4: Bob simulates the tag protocol with state Sb and interact with Alice
5: Alice sets a such that IDa = Output
If the instance of the protocol is correct, Alice obtains a = b. This proves the
correctness of the key agreement. Note that the number of message rounds
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is the same as in the RFID protocol. An adversary is an algorithm P which
takes (KP , S0, S1) and the transcript τ of the RFID protocol and returns a
bit P(KP , S0, S1, τ). We can now define an adversary A against the RFID
scheme.
1: create tag ID0 and tag ID1, draw them, corrupt them, get their states S0 and
S1, and free them
2: draw a random tag (vtag, ·)← DrawTag(Pr[ID0] = Pr[ID1] = 12 )
3: (·, τ)← Execute(vtag)
4: set a = P(KP , S0, S1, τ)
5: get T and output whether T (vtag) = IDa
Clearly, this is a narrow-strong adversary such that Pr[A wins] = Pr[P wins].
There must exist a blinder B such that Pr[A wins] − Pr[AB wins] is negli-
gible. Clearly, AB gets no information on whether ID0 or ID1 is drawn, so
Pr[AB wins] = 12 . Hence, Pr[P wins]− 12 is negligible: the key agreement proto-
col is secure. uunionsq
We can similarly prove the following result.
Theorem 12. A narrow-forward private stateless RFID scheme can be trans-
formed into a secure key agreement with same number of rounds.
This is why protocols like OSK [30] require tags to update their states.
Proof. We proceed as before and use the following adversaryA.
1: create tag ID0 and tag ID1
2: draw one tag at random (vtag, ·)← GetTag(Pr[ID0] = Pr[ID1] = 12 )
3: (·, τ)← Execute(vtag)
4: Free(vtag)
5: draw tag ID0 and tag ID1, corrupt them, get their states S0 and S1
6: set a = P(KP , S0, S1, τ)
7: get T and output whether T (vtag) = IDa
We observe that Execute does not modify the state of vtag. uunionsq
4 Case Studies
4.1 Weak Privacy based on a Pseudorandom Function
We first construct a weak-private and secure protocol based on a pseudoran-
dom function family (PRF). Let (Fs,K)K∈{0,1}k(s) be a family of functions from
{0, 1}δ(s) to {0, 1}γ(s). We say it is a PRF if k, δ, γ are polynomially bounded,
if 2−δ(s), and 2−γ(s) are negligible, if Fs,K(x) is computable in polynomial time,
and if any distinguisher with polynomial complexity has a negligible advantage
for distinguishing an oracle simulating Fs,K initialized with a random K from
an oracle initialized with a truly random function. For more readability we omit
the parameter s.
We construct an RFID scheme as depicted on Fig. 1 with α = β = δ2 . The
algorithm SetupTag(ID) simply picks a random k-bit key K and sets S = K.
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Tag System
state: S (S = K) {. . . , (ID,K), . . .}
pick b ∈ {0, 1}β a←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− pick a ∈ {0, 1}α
c = FS(a, b)
b,c−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ find (ID,K) s.t. c = FK(a, b)
output: ID or ⊥ if not found
Fig. 1. A Weak-Private RFID Scheme based on PRF.
1. Reader picks a random α-bit string a and sends it to tag.
2. Tag with state S sends a random β-bit string b and c = FS(a, b) to reader.
3. Reader looks for (ID,K) in the database such that c = FK(a, b) and gets ID.
This protocol is essentially equivalent to the ISO/IEC 9798-2 3-pass mutual
authentication protocol that is used in [14] and to the CR building block of [28],
both without their third pass (the reader authentication pass). The randomized
Hash-Lock identification scheme [39] is this one with no a. But this opens the
door to delay attacks where the reader protocol is launched after the tag protocol
completed (so conversation are no longer matching). ISO/IEC 9798-2 2-pass
unilateral authentication is this protocol with no b [14]. But this opens the door
to privacy threats by replaying a.
Theorem 13. If F is a PRF, the above RFID scheme is secure and weak pri-
vate.
Note 14. The scheme is clearly not narrow-forward private since afterward cor-
ruption makes it possible to link tags. So, as corollary of this theorem, weak
privacy does not imply forward privacy and narrow-weak privacy does not im-
ply narrow-forward privacy.
Proof. Correctness. No false negative is possible here. False positives and incor-
rect identifications are possible when given the selected tag key K and (a, b)
values, there exists K ′ 6= K in the database such that FK(a, b) = FK′(a, b).
Let us assume that we have n legitimate tags in addition to a subject tag. We
construct a distinguisher that simulates the creation of the n tags and simulates
a protocol between the subject tag and the reader. To compute FK on a given
input with the subject tag, A sends the input to an oracle which returns the
output. If the subject tag is correctly identified in the simulation, A answers 1,
otherwise it answers 0. This is a distinguisher for F , so it has a negligible advan-
tage. When the oracle implements a random function, the probability of incorrect
identification is bounded by n2−γ which is negligible. Hence, the probability of
incorrect identification with the right oracle is also negligible.
Security. We first note that the protocol suits the special form in Lemma 5
where R(ID,K; a, b, c) ⇐⇒ FK(a, b) = c and R′ is always true. We can thus
prove simple security and apply Lemma 5.
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Let A be an adversary for simple security with a single tag ID. W.l.o.g. we
assume that A does not call R since R can be simulated. Since database entries
are never modified we can reduce to the case where only the target pi is launched
and others are simulated. A calls SendReader(pi) → aˆ at time t and ends by
SendReader((bˆ, cˆ), pi). A further calls SendTag(ai, ID)→ (bi, ci) at time t′i. A
wins if cˆ = FK(aˆ, bˆ) and for every i such that t < t′i we have (ai, bi, ci) 6= (aˆ, bˆ, cˆ)
(namely: conversations are not matching). As for correctness, let A′ be an algo-
rithm who simulates A and all oracles then looks whether the attack succeeded.
To simulate SendTag(ai, ID), A′ simply picks a random bi and queries an oracle
F with (ai, bi) to get ci and returns (bi, ci). To determine whether the attack
succeeded, A′ queries the oracle F again. Clearly, A and A′ interacting with an
oracle simulating FK have the same success probability. A′ can be considered as
a distinguisher between F and a truly random function. Since F is pseudoran-
dom, the distinguisher has negligible advantage, so A′ interacting with an oracle
simulating a random function has similar success probability as A. If t′i < t,
Pr[aˆ = ai] is negligible. If now t < t′i, wining cases are for (ai, bi, ci) 6= (aˆ, bˆ, cˆ),
ci = F (ai, bi), cˆ = F (aˆ, bˆ), thus (ai, bi) 6= (aˆ, bˆ). However, if (ai, bi) 6= (aˆ, bˆ), the
value for F (aˆ, bˆ) before the final query is free so Pr[cˆ = F (aˆ, bˆ)] = 2−k, which is
negligible. Therefore, A succeeds with negligible probability. This proves simple
security. Lemma 5 concludes.
Weak privacy. Thanks to Lemma 8, we only have to prove narrow-weak privacy.
We want to prove that, for any narrow-weak adversary A, there exists a blinder
B such that A has no significant advantage over AB . Let B be the blinder who
simulates SendTag(a, vtag) by answering with a random (b, c).
Clearly, all Launch and SendReader queries can be perfectly simulated
so we assume w.l.o.g. that these oracles are no longer used. We use the proof
methodology of Shoup [37]. Let game0 = game1(0) be the privacy game.
Let game1(i) be the same game as game1(i−1) in which the ith created tag is
simulated using an ad-hoc random oracle Fi from {0, 1}α+β to {0, 1}γ to compute
FKi(a, b) = Fi(a, b). Clearly, |Pr[A wins game1(i)] − Pr[A wins game1(i − 1)]|
can be expressed as a distinguisher advantage for F so it is negligible. Let
game1 = game1(n) where n is the number of tags. Since n is polynomial,
|Pr[A wins game1]− Pr[A wins game0]| is negligible.
Let game2 be the same game as game1 in which the adversary wins when
SendTag never picked a duplicate b. This duplication happens with probabil-
ity bounded by q2 · 2−β where q is the number of SendTag queries. Clearly,
this probability is negligible. Hence |Pr[A wins game2] − Pr[A wins game0]| is
negligible.
Using B, |Pr[AB wins game2] − Pr[AB wins game0]| is negligible as well.
Clearly, the B simulation is perfect when there is no duplicate b. This leads
us to |Pr[AB wins game2] − Pr[A wins game2]| being negligible. Finally, we ob-
tain that |Pr[AB wins game0] − Pr[A wins game0]| is negligible. Hence, A is a
trivial adversary. uunionsq
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4.2 Narrow-Destructive Privacy in the Random Oracle Model
We now consider a new scheme based on two oracles F and G running random
functions from {0, 1}α+k and {0, 1}k to {0, 1}k, respectively. The tag generation
algorithm SetupTag(ID) picks a random k-bit key K and sets the initial state to
S = K. The protocol works as depicted on Fig. 2.
1. Reader picks a random α-bit string a and sends it to tag.
2. Tag with state S sends c = F (S, a) then refreshes its state S with G(S).
3. Reader looks for (ID,K) in the database such that c = F (Gi(K), a) with
i < t, gets ID, and replaces (ID,K) by (ID, Gi(K)) in the database.
Note that after t iterations without the reader a tag can no longer be identified.
Thus, this scheme does not satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 8. (See also Note 18.)
As opposed to the previous construction, F and G cannot be just PRFs since
the adversary can get the code of F and G by corrupting a tag.
Tag System
state: S (S = K) {. . . , (ID,K), . . .}
a←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− pick a ∈ {0, 1}α
c = F (S, a)
c−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ find (ID,K) and i s.t.
replace S by G(S) c = F (Gi(K), a) and i < t
replace K by Gi(K)
output: ID or ⊥ if not found
Fig. 2. A Narrow-Destructive-Private RFID Scheme based on a Random Oracle.
The OSK protocol [30,31] uses no a, so delay attacks can be made. Avoine et
al. [3] proposed to add a random a and use c = F (S⊕a). Dimitriou [12] proposed
to add a (useless) b and to send F (S) and b in addition to c = F (S, a, b).4
Theorem 15. Assuming that k and t are polynomially bounded and that 2−k
is negligible, the above scheme is a secure and narrow-destructive private RFID
scheme in the random oracle model.
Note 16. This is not narrow-strong private since early corruption enables to link
tags. So, narrow-destructive privacy does not imply narrow-strong privacy.
Note 17. We can artificially tweak the protocol of Th. 15 to get narrow-forward
privacy but not narrow-destructive privacy, which separates the two models.
To do so, we add in all tag states a common secret Ks such that when a tag
receives a = Ks it outputs c = S. Readers should not select a = Ks but narrow-
destructive adversaries could do so after a tag is sacrificed to leak Ks. Obvi-
ously, the scheme is no longer narrow-destructive private. Nevertheless, it is still
narrow-forward private since corruption output cannot be used in interaction.
4 Sending F (S) is used to decrease the workload in optimistic cases.
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Note 18. As pointed out in Juels-Weis [24], a weak adversary against the scheme
of Fig. 2 could run a sort of denial of service. The adversary proceeds as fol-
lows.
1: CreateTag(ID0), CreateTag(ID1)
2: vtag0 ← DrawTag(ID0)
3: for i = 1 to t+ 1 do
4: pick a random x
5: SendTag(x, vtag0)
6: end for
7: Free(vtag0)
8: (vtag, ·)← DrawTag(Pr[ID0] = Pr[ID1] = 12 )
9: (pi, ·)← Execute(vtag)
10: x← Result(pi)
11: get T and output whether T (vtag) = IDx
Clearly, Pr[A wins] = 1, but for any blinder B, we have Pr[AB wins] = 12 . So
this weak adversary is not trivial. Hence, narrow-destructive privacy does not
imply weak privacy.
Proof. Correctness. False negatives are not possible. False positives and wrong
identifications are possible when given K, a, b, and i, there exist K ′ and j < t
such that K ′ 6= K and F (Gi(K), a, b) = F (Gj(K ′), a, b). In the random oracle
model, the probability of such event is at most nt22−k, which is negligible.
Security. We apply Lemma 5 where oracle R(ID,K; a, c) simply checks that there
exists i < t such that F (Gi(K), a) = c and R′(n)⇐⇒ n < t. By using standard
random oracle techniques, we can assume that A never queries F with Gi(K)
for i = 0, . . . , t+ n− 1 and n is the number of SendTag queries.
We proceed as in the proof of Th. 13 with same notations. If t′i < t, Pr[aˆ = ai]
is negligible. If t < t′i, wining cases are for (ai, ci) 6= (aˆ, cˆ) and cˆ = F (Gj(K), aˆ)
for some j smaller than t. Since A never queried F with any Gj(K) and the
tag did not query it with any (Gj(K), aˆ), the values of F (Gj(K), aˆ) are free so
Pr[cˆ = F (Gj(K), aˆ); j < t] = t2−k, which is negligible.
Narrow-destructive privacy. Clearly, all Launch and SendReader queries are
trivial to simulate since no Result query is allowed. So, we assume w.l.o.g. that
no such query is made. We want to prove that, for any adversary A there exists
a blinder B such that A has no significant advantage over AB .
Let E (resp. E′) be the event that at least one of the queries by A to the F
or the G oracles equals one query made (resp. that should have been made if it
was not blinded) by some SendTag(a, vtag) query.
SendTag queries are simulated by B by returning a random c. Note that
there is no SendTag query to corrupted tags since adversaries are destruc-
tive. This simulation is perfect (in the sense that the adversary and the blinded
adversary recover the same information about the virtual tag from the proto-
col transcript) when the event E does not occur. Namely, Pr[A wins|¬E] =
Pr[AB wins|¬E′] and Pr[E] = Pr[E′].
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Hence, |Pr[A wins] − Pr[AB wins]| ≤ Pr[E]. If q queries to F and G were
made by A, in the worst case A knows that all Gi(K)’s are in a set of 2k − q
values. Note that no Corrupt query gives information on any Gi(K) that can
be used by any SendTag query. The probability to pick one is at most tn
2k−q
where n is the number of tags. Hence, E occurs with probability at most tnq
2k−q ,
which is negligible. uunionsq
4.3 Narrow-Strong and Forward Privacy based on a PKC
We now achieve narrow-strong and forward privacy using public-key cryptogra-
phy. We use the standard definitions of public-key cryptosystems (PKC), IND-
CPA and IND-CCA security [6,13,20,29,34]. A PKC consists of a key generator,
a probabilistic encryption algorithm, and a deterministic decryption algorithm.
It must be correct in the sense that the decryption of the encryption of any
x is always x. The scheme is IND-CPA-secure (resp. IND-CCA-secure) if all
polynomial-time adversaries win the IND-CPA (resp. IND-CCA) with negligible
advantage. In the IND-CPA game, the adversary receives a public key, submits
two plaintexts, receives the encryption of one of the two, and tries to guess
which plaintext was encrypted. In the IND-CCA game, the adversary can query
a decryption oracle, except on the received ciphertext.
Tag System
state: KP , ID,K (K = FKM (ID)) secret keys: KS ,KM
a←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− pick a ∈ {0, 1}α
c = EncKP (ID||K||a) c−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ parse DecKS (c) = ID||K||a′
check a = a′
check K = FKM (ID)
output: ID or ⊥ if failed
Fig. 3. A Narrow-Strong and Forward -Private RFID Scheme based on a PKC.
We initialize the scheme by generating a private/public key pair (KS ,KP ) for
the Enc/Dec PKC. The tag generation algorithm SetupTag(ID) picks a random
k-bit key K and sets the initial state to S = (KP , ID,K). We assume that k and
α are polynomial. The protocol works as depicted on Fig. 3.
1. Reader sends an identification request with an α-bit random a.
2. Tag calculates c = EncKP (ID||K||a) and sends c to the reader.
3. Reader gets ID||K||a = DecKS (c) and checks that a is correct and that
(ID,K) is in database.5
5 Using K = FKM (ID) as depicted on Fig. 3 given a PRF F and a master secret KM
does not modify our result. The same simplification could apply to the scheme of
Fig. 1 as well, in order to shrink the database.
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Theorem 19. If the public-key cryptosystem is IND-CPA-secure then the above
RFID scheme is narrow-strong private. If the cryptosystem is IND-CCA-secure
and 2−k is negligible, the RFID scheme is further secure and forward private.
Namely, with an IND-CCA PKC, this RFID scheme achieves privacy with re-
spect to the class
FORWARD ∪ (NARROW ∩ STRONG).
Due to Th. 9, this scheme is not strong private so narrow-strong privacy does
not imply strong privacy and forward privacy does not imply strong privacy.
Proof. Correctness. This comes from the correctness of the cryptosystem.
Narrow-strong privacy. We prove that for any narrow-strong adversary A there
exists a blinder B such that A has no significative advantage over AB . Since the
reader just sends random a and no Result query is allowed, every Launch and
SendReader query can be simulated in a trivial way so we can assume without
loss of generality that no such query is done. We construct the blinder by using
standard hybrid arguments. We consider the hybrid blinder Bi which works as
follows: any of the i first SendTag queries with input a, returns the encryption
c of a random r of same length as ID||K||a. Other SendTag queries by A are
forwarded to the SendTag oracle.
The adversary, hybrid blinders, and tags can be simulated without using KS .
Let Si be a simulator for the ABi attack except for the ith SendTag query which
is indeed released. We use Si to play the IND-CPA game. At the beginning, Si
receives KP and runs the simulator for ABi . At the moment of the ith query
a, Si computes m0 = ID||K||a as Bi−1 would do to simulate the tag, computes
m1 = r as Bi would do, and submits m0 and m1 to the IND-CPA game. Si
receives an encrypted value c of either m0 or m1 that is used to respond the
query and continues the simulation. At the end, Si looks whether ABi won the
privacy game or not. If it won, Si outputs 0. Otherwise, Si outputs 1. Clearly
A = AB0 , AdvIND(Si) = Pr[ABi−1 wins] − Pr[ABi wins], and B = BqT is a full
blinder where qT is the number of SendTag queries. The complexity of Si is
polynomial. Due to IND-CPA security, |Pr[A wins]−Pr[AB wins]| is negligible.
Security. The protocol suits the special form in Lemma 5 where R(ID,K; a, c)
means DecKS (c) = ID||K||a and R′ is always true. We can thus prove simple
security and apply Lemma 5.
Let A be an adversary for the simple security game with a single tag ID and
a single instance pi (others are simulated). W.l.o.g. A does not query R(·; ·, c)
when there is a protocol transcript (·, c). (The first input of R queries cannot
be ID thus R cannot be satisfied.) A queries SendReader(pi) → aˆ at time
t, SendTag(ai, ID) → ci at time t′i, and ends by SendReader(cˆ, pi). If t′i < t,
Pr[ai = aˆ] is negligible. If t < t′i, wining cases are for (aˆ, cˆ) 6= (ai, ci), DecKS (cˆ) =
ID||K||aˆ, and DecKS (ci) = ID||K||ai. Hence, w.l.o.g. we can assume that cˆ 6= ci
for all i.
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We construct a partial blinder Bi as before. We construct a simulator Si
for ABi playing the IND-CCA game as before. Si terminates by determining
whether A succeeded by calling cˆ to a decryption oracle. Finally, by using the
IND-CCA security, we obtain a blinded adversary AB such that |Pr[A wins]−
Pr[AB wins]| is negligible. Clearly, if the tag is no longer used and the reader
leaks no information, making it identify the tag reduces to guessing the tag key
K which can only happen with probability 2−k, which is negligible.
Forward privacy. Narrow-forward privacy implies forward privacy thanks to
Lemma 8, uunionsq
5 Conclusion
We have proven that public-key cryptography can assure the highest level of
feasible privacy in RFID: narrow-strong and forward privacy, even with stateless
protocols. We have shown narrow-destructive privacy for an OSK-like protocol
in the random oracle model. Finally, we have proven weak privacy for a simple
challenge-response protocol. The problem of achieving destructive privacy or
forward privacy without public-key techniques are left open.
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